A comprehensive analysis of financial disclosures from the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), the Bank of Ghana (BoG), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates that GoldBod operated at a profit in 2025, according to SME and Financial Management Advisor Dickson Assan, CA.
Addressing recent public debate over the financial viability of the newly established entity, Assan explained that his assessment follows documented accounting figures to separate factual financial reporting from political narrative.
“I have spent some hours going through GoldBod’s 2025 Annual Report, the Bank of Ghana’s 2025 Annual Report, and the IMF’s December 2025 Fifth Review under Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme,” Assan stated. “My aim is to provide an accountant’s objective comprehensive analysis of the performance of Ghana Gold Board – GoldBod for the purposes of public education. My responsibility as an accountant is to follow the numbers, understand the accounting treatment behind them, and separate the facts as documented from the propaganda and politics.”
According to the financial statements, GoldBod posted a total revenue of GHS 5.55 billion for the 2025 financial year, which included a GHS 4.55 billion government grant designated as a revolving trade-capital subvention for gold purchasing. Total expenditure stood at GHS 109.6 million, leaving a net surplus of GHS 5.44 billion.
“Is the GoldBod a loss-making entity? The data proves that the entity is NOT a loss-making entity for the 2025 financial year,” Assan declared. “The company’s total revenue was GHS5.55 billion cedis. This included a GHS4.55 billion grant from the government to be used to purchase the gold. You’re asking, but why did they include that as part of their revenue? That’s a correct accounting treatment under IPSAS 23 – Revenue from Non-Exchange Transactions.”
Evaluating the core operational performance without the capital injection, Assan noted that the firm remained profitable.
“Even if we take out the grant from the government, Goldbod would still have made a profit of GHS896.3 million,” he observed. “This is about 5x more than the restated 2024 surplus of GHS178.48 million made by then PMMC. This represents an increase of about 402%.”
Assan clarified that while the GHS 4.55 billion grant sits on the balance sheet as unspent cash, its recognition as revenue adheres to international public sector accounting rules.
“I must, however, state that the grant was disclosed by GoldBod itself as a revolving trade-capital subvention for gold purchasing and trading,” he noted. “When we go to their balance sheet, that amount is sitting there as unspent cash. So while it is legitimately revenue under IPSAS, it is a one-off capital injection, not recurring income, and hence the GHS896.3 million ex-grant figure shows a true and fair view of the performance of GoldBod.”
Looking ahead to future reporting periods, Assan cautioned against misinterpreting potential revenue drops in 2026 due to accounting base effects.
“Now because IPSAS recognizes the full grant as revenue in the year it was received, I don’t expect to see it as revenue in 2026 unless the government has pumped in extra monies,” he explained. “Assuming GoldBod’s 2026 revenue and surplus fall below the 2025 figures, that should not automatically be read as a decline in performance. It would largely be the base effect of a one-off capital injection not recurring. Hence, the ex-grant, like-for-like comparison will again be the fairer basis for judging how the entity actually performed.”
Regarding claims that GoldBod reduced expenditure by 15.5%, Assan indicated that headline operational savings require nuanced interpretation. Total spending fell from GHS 129.7 million in 2024 to GHS 109.6 million in 2025 because of the elimination of finance costs, which stood at GHS 46.04 million in 2024.
“Did total expenditure decline by 15.5%, as has been argued by the CEO of GoldBod? On the surface of the accounts, yes,” Assan stated. “Total expenditure fell 15.5% from GHS129.7 million in 2024 to GHS109.6 million in 2025. The entire decline is explained by the absence of finance cost in 2025. In 2024, finance cost was GHS46.04 million. In fact, if you strip finance cost out of both years and compare the genuine operating cost lines, actual operating costs rose from GH¢83.6 million in 2024 to GH¢109.6 million in 2025, representing an increase of about 31%.”
He noted that this cost expansion aligns with organizational scaling, including an increase in workforce from 114 to 450 employees.
“Is this concerning? No! That is reasonable and explainable considering the sizable increase in operations compared to the then PMMC,” Assan remarked. “For example, employee strengths increased by 4x from 114 to 450. The narrative that total expenditure fell by 15.5% is technically correct, but it doesn’t show a true reflection of what happened.”
Assan addressed the source of public confusion regarding alleged losses, pointing out that gold-trading risks sit with the central bank rather than GoldBod.
“First, it must be emphasized that GoldBod does not itself buy and trade gold on its own balance sheet under the Gold-for-Reserves (G4R) programme,” Assan explained. “It acts as the Bank of Ghana’s buying agent for artisanal and small-scale (ASM) gold, earning a fee for doing so. The actual gold trading position, and the risk that comes with it, sits with the Bank of Ghana, not GoldBod.”
Audited central bank reports recorded a net loss on gold transactions across its programmes of GHS 9.05 billion in 2025, up from GHS 5.66 billion in 2024, with GHS 8.85 billion attributed to the G4R initiative. The IMF’s Fifth Review highlighted third-quarter 2025 losses of US$ 214 million on the artisanal gold segment, recommending these costs be transparently reflected in the national budget rather than absorbed by the Bank of Ghana.
“When the loss is netted against the gain of GHS 9.57 billion from the sale of refined and bullion gold in 2025, BoG’s overall gold-related position for the year was close to break-even, not a straightforward loss story,” Assan observed. “Is this GoldBod’s loss? Technically, no! The loss is recognised in the Bank of Ghana’s financial statements under the G4R programme, not in GoldBod’s statement of financial performance.”
He emphasized that while the central bank records the losses, GoldBod remains interconnected with the overall policy implementation.
“However, we should also not go to the other extreme and say GoldBod has absolutely nothing to do with the losses,” Assan stated. “GoldBod operates within the architecture of the program, and some program costs can arise from fees and the arrangements through which the gold is purchased and supplied. The IMF specifically identified trading losses and costs associated with the ASM doré transactions.”
Because GoldBod only commenced operations in April 2025 with its board inaugurated in May 2025, Assan noted that the 2025 financial figures capture a partial transition year.
“In many ways, it is still too early to make a firm judgement on whether GoldBod is ultimately creating value for Ghanaians or imposing a cost on the public purse,” Assan said. “GoldBod only became operational in April 2025, and its Board was inaugurated in May 2025. So the 2025 accounts cover only a partial first year and still contain transitional figures inherited from PMMC. And this matters because efficiency is rarely achieved fully in the first year of a new institution.”
He added that firm conclusions regarding long-term performance remain premature until full-year operations are audited.
“That is why 2025 cannot yet give us the full picture of GoldBod’s true operating performance, cost structure, sustainability and its relationship with the gains and losses arising from the wider gold-purchasing programme,” Assan noted. “The more meaningful test will come after GoldBod completes its first full financial year in 2026. So whether one is already celebrating GoldBod as a major success or condemning it as a loss-making venture, I think both conclusions are premature at this stage.”
With GoldBod securing rights to acquire 30% of domestic large-scale gold production under the Ghana Accelerated National Reserve Accumulation Policy (GANRAP), Assan advocated for integrated reporting between state institutions.
“Going forward, Ghanaians need a clear and transparent reconciliation between GoldBod, the Bank of Ghana, and the wider gold-purchasing programme,” Assan emphasized. “This becomes even more important now that GoldBod has secured an agreement to acquire 30% of Ghana’s large-scale gold production to support the country’s strategic reserves under the Ghana Accelerated National Reserve Accumulation Policy (GANRAP). As the volume and value of gold passing through GoldBod increase, the public should be able to trace the full financial flow from purchase to final disposal.”
Assan outlined seven specific parameters required for transparent public accounting across the gold sector:
“I suggest the reconciliation clearly shows: how much gold was purchased; the purchase price; how the purchases were financed; fees and other costs incurred; gains or losses recorded by GoldBod; gains or losses recorded by the Bank of Ghana; and what portion, if any, ultimately becomes a fiscal cost to Government. Without this reconciliation, one institution may report a surplus while losses connected to the same programme appear elsewhere in the public accounts. The key question should therefore be: after all purchases, financing costs, fees, valuation movements and sales are accounted for, what is the net benefit or cost to Ghana? That is the level of transparency and accountability we should demand as GoldBod’s role in Ghana’s gold sector expands.”
By: Rainbowradioonline.com/Ghana
