The five-member committee that probed the Akosombo Dam spillage has submitted a comprehensive report to President John Dramani Mahama.
The committee made some recommendations to address the widespread devastation caused by the 2023 dam spillages in Akosombo and Kpong.
The 110-page report was submitted through the Energy and Green Transition, John Abdulai Jinapor, for him to hand it over to the President.
President John Mahama set the committee to probe the matter, and it took them two months of in-depth investigations.
The Volta River Authority (VRA) conducted controlled spillages from the dams between September 15 and October 30, 2023, due to what it termed ‘dangerously high water levels.
After the exercise, nearly 40,000 people and extensive damage occurred across the Volta Region, particularly in North Tongu, Central Tongu, South Tongu, Ada, and Kpong.
It further destroyed 1,247 homes, 94 schools, and 17 health facilities, while agricultural losses alone are estimated at $78 million.
Below are the recommendations by the committee:
1. Establishing a Controlled Spillage Floodplain: To minimise the impact of future controlled spillages from the Akosombo Dam, a designated floodplain should be delineated to accommodate spill discharges of up to 497,936cfs (14,100m3/s), i.e., a 1:50-year flood in the short term to medium term in response to climate change uncertainties and 1:100 years, i.e. 540,313cfs (15,300m3/s), in the Long Term. Resilience improvement projects should consider critical public infrastructure upgrades located in the floodplain, e.g., Sogakope bridge, hospitals, etc. A resettlement plan should be considered for all people and properties located in the floodplain. A Legislative Instrument for the downstream floodplain (contour line) is required to prevent inhabitants from settling or building in that floodplain.
2. Enhance Emergency Preparedness: Establish and regularly update comprehensive disaster preparedness plans locally, referencing the VRA’s Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP). Simplify the EPP to make it user-friendly by adopting strategies to interpret it in infographics and using local languages in its communication.
3. High Turnover and Divisions Amongst Political Appointees: Create a collaborative task force comprising MCEs, MPs and stakeholders to focus on disaster preparedness. Implement a conflict resolution process, such as mediation or facilitation, to address disagreements constructively and establish accountability measures, such as public reports on disaster preparedness efforts, to hold leaders responsible for their efforts in disaster management.
4. Improve Communication: Develop clear communication channels to ensure the timely dissemination of information regarding flood risks and response measures.
5. Resourcing of NADMO and District Assemblies: Provide adequate funding for district assemblies. In addition, Emergency response centres should be provided with backup systems and stockpiles of essentials to respond to disasters.
6. Lack of Localised Emergency Preparedness Plan in most districts: Organise regular drills and simulations to practice emergency response procedures
secure funding and resources to support developing and implementing localised EPPs and updating Disaster Management Plans.
7. Strengthen Community Engagement: Improve community education programs and education curricula in schools to raise awareness about future flood risks and the importance of adhering to building regulations in flood- prone areas.
8. Implementing Engineering Solutions for Flood Management: Engineering solutions can be employed along the downstream catchment area to enhance flood management by improving the capacity to regulate water flow and mitigate the impact of controlled spillages on downstream communities. These solutions can increase water conveyance efficiency and enhance the river system’s ability to accommodate excess water without severe inundation, e.g., Mepe.
9. Delineation of floodplains: Delineate floodplains by improving vegetative cover with identifiable plantations, i.e., mangrove (downstream), use of concrete pillars or bamboo plantation (upstream & downstream)
10. Safe Havens Management: Develop multipurpose structures on high grounds that can be used as classrooms or town halls in the affected communities and easily reconfigured as safe havens when needed. Offer psychological support services to help residents cope with the stress of displacement and promote community cohesion. Establish channels for residents to provide feedback on their experience and suggest improvements for the safe haven.
11. Compensation: During the Committee’s discussion with people in the affected communities, the issue of compensation was vehemently reiterated. The Committee strongly recommends that the government provide adequate compensation to the affected communities upstream and downstream, which are predominantly made up of farmers, fishermen and businesses. This particular recommendation is very pertinent to the people in the affected communities. In addition, the Government should audit all damaged properties and loss of livelihoods to enable them to distribute compensation adequately as outlined in the budget of 2025.
12. Procedure for payment of compensation: An account should be opened for each affected district, and funds for compensation should be deposited. A “Claims Office” for the disbursement of the funds should also be set up to receive data on the affected flood victims who are eligible for compensation. The Ministry of Finance shall be the supervisory body and shall work with the Member of Parliament (MP) and the District Assembly of the affected community in the disbursement of monies meant for compensation. Third parties such as the
Chiefs, Queen mothers and opinion leaders in the affected communities may be needed to confirm certain claims made by the affected people. The signatories to the account are to be the Ministry of Finance and either the MP or the DCE.
The Committee identified 15 key issues from its probe which are as follows:
1. Factors that determine water spillage from the dam include reservoir elevation, rainfall and energy output from the power plant.
2. The Akosombo Dam recorded a maximum water inflow of 477,984 cubic feet per second (cfs) on September 18, 2023, at the Akosombo hydrometric station.
3. The 2023 Spill occurred between September 15 and October 30, 2023. The total volume of water discharged from the spillway was approximately 8 Million Acre Feet (MAF) for 46 days.
4. Historical spillage exercises have shown that in 1968, the volume was 5 times the volume spilled in 2023, indicating that there could be larger volumes of spill in the future due to climate change uncertainties.
5. Examination of Events Leading to Spillage: The spillage was primarily caused by releasing approximately 8 MAF volumes of water from the Akosombo Dam to prevent the dam’s destruction (overtopping) due to high reservoir water levels. Other contributing factors included unprecedented rainfall due to climate change and human activities exacerbating flood risks. Breaching the dam could have resulted in a catastrophic chain of events in the country.
6. VRA’s Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP): The EPP specifies the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, including VRA, NADMO, District Assemblies, Security Agencies, etc., when an emergency occurs. The EPP was used to manage the disaster caused by the spillage and was the most technical document to be understood by various non-technical stakeholders. While VRA had socialised the document with all stakeholders and conducted a simulation exercise for some selected communities before the spill, high turnout and divisions amongst some District Chief Executives (DCEs)/Metropolitan Chief Executives (MCEs) and Members of Parliament (MPs) could have derailed clear communication lines for implementing the plan and distribution of relief items.
7. Assessment of Actions Taken: The response involved various government agencies, including the Volta River Authority (VRA) and the National Disaster
Management Organisation (NADMO). While there were efforts to provide immediate assistance, gaps in communication, resource allocation, and community engagement were identified.
8. Challenges Encountered: The Committee noted operational challenges, such as a lack of local disaster preparedness plans and inadequate evacuation resources, that hampered the emergency response process. Communication breakdowns and skepticism among community members regarding the information provided by authorities further complicated response efforts.
9. Community Challenges: The Committee also noted that land tenure attachment by the people, economic reliance on location, fear of unpredictability, insufficient financial resources and support from Authorities, restricted housing options, historical precedence of spillage and cultural resistance were factors that made most affected people unwilling to relocate during the spill event.
10. Temporal accommodation: The Committee noted with concern that some affected persons were still housed in tents, at the mercy of the weather, refusing to relocate to temporary accommodation built by VRA. They cited a lack of privacy as families were required to share rooms.
11. Resettlement: Some Government-initiated resettlement projects are far from the people’s previous abode. The people lament that their opinions were not sought in selecting the sites for the resettlement, and therefore, have refused to relocate and are requesting that the resettlement project be halted as the objective is not served.
12. Compensation: Since the spillage occurred, in communities upstream and downstream, the affected people in these communities have not been adequately compensated for the devastating impact the floods had on their properties and source of livelihoods. Some also expressed displeasure that though they suffered and continue to suffer the direct effects of the dam, they were not compensated when the Akosombo dam was built.
13. Evaluation of Strategies: The strategies employed to manage the situation revealed short-term and long-term effectiveness. However, improvements were necessary in community education and disaster management protocols.
14. Proposals for Additional Measures: To mitigate future risks, recommendations were made for enhancing emergency response protocols, improving community engagement, and implementing stricter land use regulations.
15. Communities Upstream: Several communities located upstream of the dam experienced significant flooding, resulting in the submersion of homes and farmland. The rising water levels inundated large portions of agricultural land, leading to the loss of crops and threatening the livelihoods of affected farmers.
By: Rainbowradioonline.com/Ghana
